Security & Threat Model
Verifiable trust. Zero-trust defaults. Post-quantum resilience.
Security Principles
Least Privilege
All services, users, and instruments operate with the minimum permissions required; privilege boundaries are enforced via typed capabilities on the Sovereign Genesis Bus.
Exploit Transparency
Attestations are public-by-default. Tamper-evidence and lineage (Merkle-DAG) convert covert failure into auditable signals.
Composable Verification
Every control emits machine-verifiable proofs (ZKChronoSeal™, ΔΣ overlays), allowing independent verifiers to reconstruct trust.
Threat Taxonomy (STRIDE × Fabric)
Category | Examples | Primary Countermeasures |
---|---|---|
Spoofing | Impersonation of instruments, key theft | CSG-1 identities, PQ signatures, mutual attestation, mTLS, key pinning |
Tampering | State manipulation, build pipeline edits | Merkle-DAG lineage, SLSA-3+ provenance, immutability windows, 4-eyes merge |
Repudiation | Action denial | Non-repudiable attestations, time-sealed proofs (ZKChronoSeal™) |
Information Disclosure | PII exfiltration, linkability | Tokenization, field-level encryption, GhostFrame™ epochs, UCL consent |
DoS | Resource exhaustion, policy engine floods | Rate-limits per identity, proof-of-work tickets, surge isolation, circuit breakers |
Elevation of Privilege | Abusing admin APIs | MFA + WebAuthn, just-in-time roles, M-of-N approvals for sensitive ops |
Controls Matrix (Prevent · Detect · Respond)
Prevent
- Post-quantum sigs (Dilithium), KEM (Kyber), hash (SHA-3/Shake)
- SLSA-3+ builds, SBOM, dependency allow-lists
- Policy Guard inline checks; UCL consent gates
- Secrets: per-env envelopes, age/Tink, KMS + HSM roots
Detect
- Attestation stream analytics (ΔΣ anomalies)
- Supply-chain drift alerts (SBOM diff)
- Behavioral thresholds (Sovereign Breach Index)
Respond
- InfinityWipe™ nullification & key rotation rituals
- Quarantine shards, policy overrides with M-of-N
- Public disclosure bundles & post-mortem proofs
Post-Quantum Cryptography & Key Management
Algorithms
- Signatures: CRYSTALS-Dilithium (level-3/5)
- KEM: CRYSTALS-Kyber (level-3/5)
- Fallback: SPHINCS+ for constrained contexts
- Hashing: SHA-3/Keccak, BLAKE3 for local ops
Key Lifecycle
- Root keys in HSM; service keys rotated ≤ 90 days
- Hardware-bound WebAuthn for human actors
- Deterministic derivation per instrument/tenant
- Dual-control ceremonies for custodial secrets
Supply Chain Integrity (SLSA · SBOM)
Build & Provenance
- Hermetic builds, pinned toolchains, reproducible releases
- Provenance attestations attached to artifacts
- Mandatory code review (4-eyes) and required checks
SBOM & Dependencies
- SBOM per artifact (CycloneDX)
- Allow-list packages; ban post-install scripts
- Automated diff alarms on SBOM drift
Privacy & Data Lifecycle
Phase | Controls | Proofs |
---|---|---|
Collection | UCL consent; purpose binding | Consent receipts, signed intents |
Storage | Encryption at rest, field tokenization | KMS envelopes, key attestations |
Access | ABAC/RBAC + JIT, M-of-N for sensitive | Access proofs, ΔΣ risk overlays |
Transfer | mTLS + PQ; policy-aware routing | Routing proofs, jurisdiction tags |
Deletion | InfinityWipe™ with lineage break | Nullification proofs, audit trail |
Incident Response (IR) & SEV Handling
Severity Model
- SEV-0: Critical sovereignty breach (public nullification)
- SEV-1: Key compromise or active exploit
- SEV-2: Degradation, suspicious lineage
Golden Hour Playbook
- Quarantine → attest → rollback/rotate
- Engage M-of-N approvers for policy overrides
- Publish public proof bundle within 24h
Post-Incident
- Root cause with ΔΣ correlation
- Update controls; regression attestations
- Community disclosure per SOSL
Interactive Risk Model
Score: 9 (Medium)
Risk Register
# | Likelihood | Impact | Score | Category |
---|
Security Headers & CSP Generator
Content Security Policy
HSTS & Misc Headers
Recommended:
- Strict-Transport-Security:
max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload
- X-Content-Type-Options:
nosniff
- X-Frame-Options:
DENY
(or CSP frame-ancestors) - Referrer-Policy:
strict-origin-when-cross-origin
- Permissions-Policy: limit sensors, camera, microphone
Vulnerability Disclosure & Bounty (Public Beta)
How to Report
- Email: security@constitutionfabric.org (PGP preferred)
- PGP Key:
keyid: 0xCF817SNF
(armored on /contact) - Response SLA: triage in 3 business days; fix ETA per severity
Safe Harbor
Good-faith research under this policy will not trigger legal action; avoid privacy violations, service disruption, and data exfiltration.
Generate /.well-known/security.txt
robots for Sensitive Areas
Block crawlers for /internal/
and /.well-known/
where appropriate.
User-agent: * Allow: / Disallow: /internal/ Disallow: /.well-known/private/ Sitemap: https://constitutionfabric.org/sitemap.xml
Hardening Checklist
Platform
- Kernel lockdown; auditd + immutable logs
- Time sync via signed sources
- Disk encryption (LUKS/FileVault)
Network
- Zero-trust overlay; per-service mTLS + PQ
- Ingress WAF + rate limits + circuit breakers
- eBPF telemetry with drop-on-unknown
Application
- CSP, HSTS, sameSite=strict cookies
- Authz: ABAC + contextual risk (SBI)
- Secrets from KMS only; no env plain-text